Another Military Coup in Niger: What Next for the AU and ECOWAS?

General Abdourahamane Tiani (C) Commander of the Presidential Guard Regiment and leader of the coup in Niger. (Credit: Balima Boureima/Anadolu Agency/Getty Images)

On 26 July 2023, the President of Niger, Mohammed Bazoum was detained by soldiers at his presidential palace in Niamey. The military, through Colonel Amadou Abdramane, announced a few hours later that they had seized power.

This latest coup becomes the 6th  successful military coup since the West African country attained independence from France in 1960. It is also the 5th successful military coup in West Africa since 2020. The AU acknowledges in its founding document, the Constitutive Act, that the scourge of conflict  impedes the continent’s socio-economic development. The AU also acknowledges that peace, security, and stability are important for regional development and integration.

In this vein, the organisation has adopted a framework to respond to unconstitutional changes of government (UCG).The Lome Declaration adopted in July 2000 was the first key document to provide guidance to the AU in responding to UCG. Furthermore, the 2002 AU Peace and Security (PSC) Protocol empowers the PSC to impose sanctions on a member state where UCG has occurred. While the 2007 African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance, considers 5 situations, including a military coup, as constituting UCG.  

In its “Agenda 2063: The Africa we want” (Agenda 2063) framework, the AU has also included “a peaceful and secure Africa” as one of its aspirations, to be realised by the year 2063. One of the goals of this aspiration is the silencing of guns on the continent by 2030 (initially targeted for 2020).

The wave of military coups in Africa continues to undermine the AU’s efforts at resolving the scourge of conflict on the continent, and the same applies to the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) including ECOWAS.

The AU and ECOWAS response to the Niger coup

In the aftermath of the detention of President Bazoum by the military on 26 July, both the AU and ECOWAS condemned what was by then an attempted coup. After Colonel Abdramane announced that the military was taking over, the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) issued a statement in which it condemned the coup and asked the military to “return immediately and unconditionally to their barracks and restore constitutional authority, within a maximum of fifteen (15) days.”  

On 30 July 2023, ECOWAS issued a communique condemning the coup and giving the military leaders 7 days to restore constitutional order. The ECOWAS statement reiterated the zero tolerance on unconstitutional change of government adopted by both the AU and ECOWAS and condemned messages of support for the military leaders by foreign governments.

The REC also imposed sanctions on Niger including the closing of air borders between ECOWAS countries and Niger, imposing a travel ban and assets freeze on military officials involved in the coup, and freezing the assets of the Republic of Niger in ECOWAS central banks. The ECOWAS  Supplementary Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance provides for the imposition of sanctions in response to unconstitutional changes of government.

The ECOWAS response has been stronger than that of the AU, which refrained from imposing sanctions, although it is empowered to do so in terms of Article 7 (1) (g) of the PSC Protocol. In addition to imposing sanctions, ECOWAS threatened military intervention in Niger.

A Defiant Military: What Next for the AU and ECOWAS?

As I have previously argued elsewhere, the AU’s aspiration for a “peaceful and secure Africa”  is an elusive dream. One of the reasons for this assertion is that despite the comprehensive framework that the AU has adopted to deal with UCG, military coups continue to be one of the main problems confronting the African continent.

The RECs including ECOWAS have been unequivocal in their condemnation of UCG. Yet, the scourge of military coups continues to afflict the West African region. Concerning the Niger coup, both the AU and ECOWAS deadlines to restore the country to constitutional order have lapsed, and the military leaders remain defiant. In response to the threat of military intervention by ECOWAS, the military leaders have closed the country’s airspace.

“…the long-term solution for the scourge of military coups in Africa lies in the AU and the RECs addressing the root causes of the problem, including the reluctance of African leaders to voluntarily give up power.”

Niger has been a strategic partner for counterterrorism in the Sahel region, with about 1100 American troops and about 1500 French troops stationed in the country before the cooperation was suspended in the wake of the coup. Niger’s neighbours Mali (2020 and 2021), Guinea (2021), and Burkina Faso (January and October 2022) experienced a surge in civilian attacks by Islamist militants following military coups between 2020 and 2022.

The AU has thus far refrained from imposing sanctions on Niger, but that remains an option.  Given the sanctions imposed by ECOWAS, questions have been raised as to the effectiveness of sanctions in response to UCG. Sanctions sometimes have the undesired effect of negatively affecting ordinary citizens, and well-connected military leaders might find a way to mitigate the impact of such sanctions, as happened in Mali.

The ECOWAS threat of military intervention has been criticized by some commentators on the basis that it might lead to a refugee crisis and the spread of  conflict across the region. This is a valid concern, considering that the military leaders who also came to power through coups in Mali and Burkina Faso,  declared their support for the Niger coup leaders during a solidarity visit by military delegates to Niger on Tuesday 8 August 2023, and they have said that any military intervention against Niger is a declaration of war against them.

The situation is volatile, and mediation efforts by Western powers including the United States have so far not yielded positive results. The Chadian President Mahamat Idriss Deby has volunteered to mediate, and he has travelled to Niger to talk to the coup leaders. Notwithstanding mediation efforts from different stakeholders and the ultimatums from the AU and ECOWAS, the military leaders announced on 10 August 2023, a new 21-member government to be led by Prime Minister Ali Mahaman Lamine Zeine.

This announcement was made just hours ahead of  ECOWAS heads of State  holding another extraordinary meeting on Niger. The extraordinary meeting is likely to result in a final decision on whether the regional bloc will forge ahead with military intervention in Niger in view of the latest developments regarding the military coup.

Conclusion

The fact that ECOWAS has played a more prominent role in responding to the military coup in Niger than the AU ought to be understood within the context of the principle of subsidiarity. In terms of this principle, the AU will only interfere as a last resort, giving the REC concerned the opportunity to deal with the matter first.

However,  given the volatility of the situation in Niger, it is imperative that the AU steps up to its role to manage the crisis unfolding in Niger, which further threatens the stability of the Sahel region. The United Nations has expressed hope that increased mediation efforts might help to resolve the conflict in Niger.

It is however asserted, in conclusion, that the long-term solution for the scourge of military coups in Africa lies in the AU and the RECs addressing the root causes of the problem, including the reluctance of African leaders to voluntarily give up power. It is through addressing the root causes of military coups in Africa that the AU’s aspiration for a “peaceful and secure Africa” can become a reality, not an elusive dream.

Linda Mushoriwa

Dr. Linda Mushoriwa is a researcher at the African Centre for Transnational Criminal Justice (ACTCJ) at the University of the Western Cape. She obtained her Ph.D. in International Criminal law from the University of KwaZulu Natal in 2019. Her research interests are international criminal justice and international law with a particular focus on the African Union; peace and security in Africa; and women’s and children’s rights.

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