Constitutionalisation of Political Parties and the State of Democracy in Sub-Saharan Africa
According to the 2024 Afrobarometer survey “Democracy at Risk – The People’s Perspective”, Africans continue to overwhelmingly reject one-party rule and prefer democracy to any other kind of government.
At the same time, less than half of Africans think their countries are democratic, and only slightly more than one-third are satisfied with the way democracy works in their countries.
As will be outlined in this blog post, this dissatisfaction is also a reflection of the way Africans experience multipartyism and how the latter is shaped by the constitutional and legal frameworks in which it operates. What follows is a brief summary of the main findings and recommendations for reform of a new comparative study entitled “Constitutionalisation of Political Parties and the State of Democracy in Sub-Saharan Africa”.
Key findings
The first key finding is that the constitutionalisation of political parties is the norm in sub-Saharan Africa. In most cases, dedicated chapters in the constitution regulate political parties to some extent and outline their main rights and obligations. Moreover, many African countries make party status dependent on registration with the state.
On the one hand, requirements for registration may be necessary to avoid the fragmentation of the political landscape; on the other hand, registration requirements and processes can also be used deliberately to ensure that an opposition party is rendered entirely dependent on the goodwill of authorities. Conversely, a complete lack of a registration process for political parties can also work against opposition parties and ultimately lead to their (self-) destruction.
Secondly, constitutional power-sharing arrangements in sub-Saharan Africa are often insufficient or inadequate. Particularistic interests based on ethnicity, religion or region play a major role in African party politics. The common constitutional response, namely to take an integrationist approach by prohibiting or ignoring these considerations, seems to have little or no effect.
This is particularly evident if one considers the widespread constitutional prohibition of ethnicity-based political parties, a prohibition which is nonetheless almost never used as a justification for actual party bans, probably due to its perceived sensitivity. Other measures aimed at fostering inter-ethnic cooperation – such as requiring parties to have a national presence or representatives of different regions in their governing bodies – seem to fare better, albeit that such requirements can also erect significant obstacles to the emergence of new political parties.
Thirdly, although several sub-Saharan African countries require political parties’ adherence to democratic principles or even explicitly require them to be internally democratic, what this means in concrete terms often remains unclear. What is clear, though, is that even where such requirements exist, they do not prevent the widespread undemocratic practices observed in many African countries. Undemocratic practices within political parties often result in internal conflict, which in turn can lead to fragmentation or defection of individuals members.
Another key finding concerns the effectiveness of regulations designed to hold ruling parties accountable. The misuse of state resources by ruling parties for their benefit is commonplace. Where dedicated regulations exist to prevent the abuse of public resources for partisan purposes, a lack of proper enforcement often means that state resources can still be used indirectly to help the ruling party.
“…constitutional and legal frameworks intended to protect the members and supporters of opposition parties from intimidation, harassment, and violence are either absent or not effectively enforced.”
In addition, although many constitutional systems in sub-Saharan Africa envisage laws dedicated to party funding, their enactment is often still pending. When it comes to the availability of public funding, sub-Saharan Africa seems to be roughly split in two halves. Such funding is generally aimed at supporting the functioning of political parties and establishing a playing level field; nevertheless, state funding can also be used by the government to control the opposition. Further gaps can be observed in the regulation of party spending: in some countries, there are no spending limits at all.
In many other countries, such limits do exist but are outdated or the enforcement mechanisms are weak. Moreover, although alliances of multiple parties under an umbrella name are a well-known phenomenon in sub-Saharan Africa, the emergence of coalition governments in many countries that were long dominated by a single party underscores the growing importance of formally recognising and regulating such cooperation.
Gaps in these frameworks can be exploited by ruling parties to co-opt smaller opponents, while opposition parties themselves often enjoy only weak protection. In particular, although many constitutional frameworks recognise the position of an opposition leader, this recognition is largely symbolic and generally limited to a parliamentary role. Furthermore, constitutional and legal frameworks intended to protect the members and supporters of opposition parties from intimidation, harassment, and violence are either absent or not effectively enforced.
Another finding concerns political party oversight. While many sub-Saharan African countries have electoral management bodies or other fourth-branch institutions to oversee political parties, this is by no means universal.
Where party oversight bodies are independent of the executive, their status, structures and governance are not always constitutionalised but left instead to statutory law, leaving them vulnerable to political interference. Even in such cases, maintaining their independence from the executive is often challenging.
It is therefore interesting to note the different approach taken in some countries, where the independence of the electoral commission is ensured not through non-partisanship but through equal representation of party members as commissioners. The African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights has found that this approach is not necessarily a violation of the obligation to establish an independent and impartial electoral body.
Lastly, despite the existence of a wide range of international and African regional standards and bodies relevant to the regulation of political parties, their impact at the domestic level appears to be fairly limited. Moreover, supranational enforcement of these standards plays only a marginal role. Regional courts seldom intervene, and when they do, their involvement is typically limited in scope and impact.
Possible Ways Forward
Against the background of these findings, there are several possible ways forward to help strengthen constitutional and legal frameworks regulating political parties in sub-Saharan Africa.
First, new ways should be considered to channel ethnic considerations in African party politics. Inspiration could be taken from Arend Lijphart’s model of consociational democracy to better manage ethnic diversity with measures that integrate, and protect, particularistic interests in the foundations of the political system. Lesser-known models to accommodate ethnic considerations such as the so-called best-loser system that obtains in Mauritius, could be studied in more detail to draw lessons for other political systems on the continent.
Secondly, given the widespread undemocratic processes and structures within many African political parties, a strong case can be made for the constitutional entrenchment of the requirement for internal party democracy, coupled with robust oversight and enforcement mechanisms.
Thirdly, party coalitions can provide a tool for the opposition to overcome fragmentation and join forces against ruling parties. To avoid uncertainties over the status and contents of such agreements, they could be made legally binding, with their basic features and requirements outlined in the agreements.
Fourthly, the legal frameworks regulating party financing need to be improved. Limitations on funding from abroad often work disproportionally against opposition parties and should be reconsidered. Where state funding does not already exist, the provision of such funds could reduce the reliance of parties on private funding and engender a more level playing field. To improve oversight of political-party financing, independent supervisory bodies need to be established or, where they already exist, strengthened.
Fifthly, the potential of regional and international standards could be leveraged more effectively. Initiatives such as the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights’ study on the implementation of the Freedom of Association Guidelines are welcome developments, but further specific guidance on the regulation of political parties would represent an important step toward strengthening existing constitutional and legal frameworks.
Furthermore, regional bodies could provide recommendations, upon request, on specific planned reforms related to the constitutionalisation of political parties, similar to the role of the Venice Commission for Council of Europe member states. In addition, sub-regional and regional approaches to election observation could be further developed and harmonised. Provisions guaranteeing and protecting the participation of civil society organisations in election observation could strengthen multipartyism and enhance the integrity of electoral processes, helping to rebuild public trust in democracy across Africa.
